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PREFACE 
In view of the variety of methods by which capacity is 
measured along with the differences that are found in the 
definition of the concept itself, it is well to state here that 
I conceive of capacity measurement as the estimation of 
probable shortrun responses by productive establishments 
to specific hypothetical alterations of economic conditions. 
I have confined myself in this monograph to those 
problems that are inherent in the idea of economic capacity 
itself and have avoided many serious problems having to 
do with the measurement of capital, the measurement of 
output, the philosophy of measurement, and the mathe-
matical properties of production functions. 
It needs to be emphasized strongly that the purpose 
here is not to develop a new concept of capacity or a new 
procedure for estimating it. Rather, it is to cope with the 
multiplicity of concepts and measures that already exist 
and with the frequent failure of estimates prepared by 
different methods to be in agreement. 
The task has been divided into four steps. The first 
is to show that all capacity concepts and arguments have 
a common structure, which consists of a list of variables 
that are always pertinent when assessing the economic 
capacity of productive equipment. The second is to show 
that the problems which arise in aggregating capacity esti-
mates and in comparing capacities for different dates can 
be expressed in the form of a few simple generalizations. 
The third is to illustrate specific problems that arise in 
preparing and interpreting capacity estimates. The fourth 
is to develop a test for the logical completeness of any 
argument about capacity. 
So that the frame of reference for the discussion will 
be clear, the various types of capacity measurements should 
be listed at this point. They are as follows: 
l. Output and capital-stock data for a previous peak in 
production or in capital outlay are used as the frame 
of reference. 
(a) Capacity is measured by peak-forward extra-
polation of output (sometimes with the presump-
tion that the peak output corresponds to the 
minimum average cost point) either from a point 
of peak-attainment or from a point at which a 
decision was made to expand fixed capital. 
(b) A capital-output ratio is measured at a 
previous peak in output or capital outlays, and 
capacity is computed for each following period by 
"plugging in" the then current capital stock (as 
actually measured or as estimated by peak-forward 
extrapolation on the basis of ( 1) capital stock in 
the reference period, ( 2) depreciation rates, and 
( 3) records on net increases of capital stock since 
the reference period). 
(c) Capital outlays are measured and simply as-
sumed to reflect the behavior of capacity. 
2. The composite response to direct inquiry on capacity 
by mail questionnaires is the frame of reference. 
Vlll 
(a) The capacity survey is open-ended. 
(b) The survey questionnaire specifies a concept 
of capacity. 
(c) The questionnaire does not specify a concept 
of capacity but does ask pointed questions that 
make it possible for the surveyor to apply a definite 
concept which he has in mind. 
(d) The survey seeks engineers' estimates of in-
stalled capacity or the original ratings of machines 
in each plant's equipment. 
3. A production function containing empirical coef-
ficients is used together with data on the current sizes 
of the stocks of productive inputs to estimate capacity 
for a domain of firms for which the production function 
used is believed to be relevant. Such a production func-
tion may be derived either from engineering estimates 
or from data on actual historical performance. 
4. Capacity is regarded as an output that is consistent 
with some input-output table or with some system of 
linear or nonlinear constraints, expressed mathematically. 
Substantial financial assistance was given to this project 
by Duke University in the form of a Ford Foundation 
Workshop Grant and a Summer Scholarship, and by David-
son College in the form of two grants from the Faculty 
Committee on Research and Summer Study. Dr. Frank 
A. Hanna, professor of economics at Duke University, has 
given substantial and constructive criticism to my work. 
To all these I wish to express my gratitude. 
Lexington, Kentucky 
January 2, 1968 
R.E.G. 
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THE DETERMINANTS 
OF ECONOMIC CAPACITY 
[JT IS widely believed by economists and others that 
many economic and political events are deeply affected by 
the relationship between actual and possible production. 
An outgrowth of this belief has been the development of 
a number of published statistical series on economic capacity. 
In attempting to prepare and interpret capacity estimates, 
it is helpful to have a model that defines and shows what 
determines capacity and which does so for any level of 
aggregation of establishments or of products. Within such 
a framework the true differences between alternative con-
cepts can be found, and possible reasons for differences 
between independently prepared estimates can be suggested. 
The shortrun constraints upon an establishment's out-
put expansion are the amount of fixed capital, its adaptabil-
ity, and its productivity; the prices, qualities, and availabili-
ties of other inputs; the shortrun possibilities for outright 
factor substitution and equipment conversion; the firm's 
desired financial position and the availability and cost of 
short-term credit; expected output prices, the expected level 
of new and unfilled orders, and the minimum tolerable 
quality of the output; and the de facto goals of the firm, as 
they relate to shortrun profit maximization. 
There are several ways in which fixed plant and equip-
ment may become inadaptable as production increases. 
Floorspace may become inadequate in such a way that 
additional employees would merely hamper operations. The 
equipment may be sufficiently indivisible so that there is 
simply nothing for additional employees to do, even though 
they may not hinder the work. Even if there is adequate 
floorspace and equipment, it may be impossible to teach 
new employees the necessary skills within the length of time 
required to carry out successfully a quick expansion of out-
put. Even if additional workers can be employed, trained, 
assigned to usable equipment, and given enough space for 
orderly and safe operations, it still may not be possible to 
take full advantage of such opportunities if the managerial 
and supervisory personnel are not sufficient in number to 
supervise the work effectively. Furthermore, a bottleneck 
at some particular stage in the chain of operations may be 
caused either by the fact that the equipment at this stage 
is less flexible than at other stages, or by the fact that there 
is a shortage of the special kind of labor or materials needed 
at this stage, or both. A bottleneck of this kind can occur 
not only at an intermediate stage but also at the beginning 
or end of the sequence of operations. A firm may be unable 
to obtain materials that, if available, could be used efficiently; 
or it may find that transportation and storage facilities are 
inadequate, so that it is unable to divest itself of its output 
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at a sufficient rate to avoid damage due to improper storage. 
Suppose that a firm's operations consist of three pro-
duction stages (A, B, and C) other than the receiving and 
shipping departments and that the fixed equipment in De-
partment B is the most inadaptable in the entire plant. If 
this is the case, then the firm's output is said to be con-
strained by Department B, regardless of what Department 
A can send on to B or of what C can do with anything B 
can forward to it. Similarly, if no more labor of the kind 
needed in Department A can be obtained in the short run, 
then the firm's output cannot exceed its current output, 
unless some form of outright factor substitution is possible. 
Furthermore, suppose that some raw material needed at 
stage C is being rationed by the government. In this case, 
output is constrained by this particular bottleneck, regard-
less of how much intermediate output Department B could 
pour into C. Again, this conclusion must be modified in 
any situation where outright factor substitution is possible 
in the short run, and, furthermore, such bottlenecks as 
these sometimes exist only with reference to a minimal 
standard of quality for the final output. 
Although the significance of any specific bottleneck in 
an establishment's operations is diminished if there is some 
other way in which the particular function can be performed, 
in view of the amount of time available for adjustment, 
many establishments do not face significant possibilities for 
outright substitution in the short run, for two reasons.1 
First, this kind of factor substitution usually implies a 
change of process, even if merely on a small scale, and 
virtually every productive process requires some fixed capital. 
While an establishment's fixed capital may be quite adapt-
1 Whenever factor proportions are varied by employing a greater 
quantity of a variable input, then factor substitution is taking place 
by definition. However, at this point we are concerned only with out-
right factor substitution, that is, only with those cases in which a 
variable input assumes some new function as output expands, as when 
newly employed workers begin to do work by hand which is ordinarily 
done by machine. 
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able to varying numbers of man-hours under a use of the 
process for which the capital equipment was intended, it is 
unlikely that such equipment would be appropriate for a 
different process. (It could happen, of course, that part 
of the stock of fixed capital is a pool of equipment or tools 
designed for an alternate process kept under wraps for 
just such a contingency.) Second, since outright factor 
substitution may involve using poorly trained workers or a 
relatively labor-intensive method, or both, or may require 
drawing into use a line of obsolete equipment, the relative 
inefficiency of the method to be substituted would often 
make its cost prohibitive. Exceptions to this could arise in 
cases where alternative parts, materials, fuels, or storage 
methods can easily be substituted for each other or in 
industries where some of the mechanical facilities are suf-
ficiently convertible so that they can be transferred readily 
from one use to another (as, for example, in sheet metal 
work). But, in general, the ability to substitute is low in 
the short run. 
Some industrial operations do not allow a variation 
of shift arrangements as a means of increasing output, and, 
in some of these cases, overtime work is either useless or 
too costly. The stock of fixed capital is thus a much more 
rigid constraint in an industry where multiple shift opera-
tions are compulsory (as in chemical distillation) than 
where they are optional (as in spinning and printing). In 
industries of the latter type, the constraining elements are 
the added labor costs to be incurred on the production line 
during extra hours of operation and the associated increases 
in the costs experienced for handling, servicing, cleaning, 
and repair. 
The ability of a firm to use whatever adaptability may 
be possessed by its fixed plant and equipment is limited by 
the prices of the variable inputs and by the depreciation 
charges for the fixed inputs. During an expansion of output 
the additional costs will consist of the new employment 
costs incurred in hiring or buying extra units of the variable 
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inputs and of any increases in depreciation charges that 
may be judged desirable or necessary in view of the more 
intense utilization of the fixed plant and equipment. The 
amount of new outlay required for these purposes as output 
expands is just as surely a constraint as is the degree of 
inadaptability of the fixed capital goods. Aside from the 
purely financial constraints upon the amount of this outlay, 
it is governed by the prices of the variable factors of pro-
duction and by other increases in costs that are associated 
with the employment of increased flows of the variable-
input services. This is the role of a price of a variable input 
(or of a depreciation charge) in constraining an output 
expansion. The influence of such a price on shortrun de-
cision-making is the same regardless of whether the price is 
set by a competitive market, by collective bargaining, by a 
monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic supplier, or by the ad-
ministrators of a government cost-control program, except 
whenever a particular method of factor pricing has some 
special effect upon the expectations or morale of workers 
or managers, or upon the flexibility of managerial policies. 
A projected shortrun output expansion may be com-
pletely feasible in view of the adaptability and factor-cost 
constraints and yet not be undertaken because of a lack of 
adequate funds to cover the additional costs. In such a 
case, the marginal worker is not hired even though he is 
productive enough to cover his wage, his training costs, 
and a modest interest charge on his advance. The operating 
funds of a firm are limited in the short run by credit con-
ditions in the economy, by the financial position (debt-
equity ratio) of the firm, and by the firm's desire for 
liquidity. 
Even if a firm would not violate its highest tolerable 
debt-equity ratio by obtaining new credit, or even if it 
would not sacrifice badly needed liquidity by taking on new 
workers, there are three additional reasons why it may not 
be possible to finance a shortrun expansion of output. 
First, credit may be both desired by the firm and available 
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at some rate of interest or discount and yet unacceptable 
to the firm because of the magnitude of the interest charge. 
Second, it is possible that the firm may not be able to 
obtain credit because the local banking community does 
not consider the firm to be within the circle of preferred 
borrowers under given conditions in the economy. Third, 
the firm's creditors may think that the firm would become, 
or is already, overextended, even if this opinion is not shared 
by the management of the firm. 
Fluctuation of the circle of preferred borrowers is not 
likely to be a major factor in the determination of capacity. 
Credit is not likely to be tight during the kind of expan-
sionary conditions that are usually hypothesized (at least 
implicitly) in the definition of capacity, and, in any case, 
major manufacturing and mining firms are likely to remain 
within the banking community's circle of preferred bor-
rowers under all conditions except perhaps that of a severe 
depression. 
With a condition of general expansion in the economic 
system, there are further reasons why financial constraints are 
not likely to be as significant as one might at first expect. 
During the part of a business expansion that comes before 
the central bank initiates restraining policies, interest charges 
would not be expected to act as a widespread constraint in 
the production planning of business firms. Furthermore, 
as commodity prices rise, the opportunity cost of holding 
cash balances rises, and, in addition, the value of these 
balances declines. These circumstances would offset the 
tendency of a low interest charge to encourage the holding 
of idle balances, and, in any case, it is during a time of 
falling, not rising, commodity prices that a businessman is 
likely to have a high liquidity preference. 
Some circumstances, however, could create a strong 
desire for liquidity which could in turn act as a constraint 
upon shortrun output expansion. (Each of these circum-
stances is more likely to have a significant effect on the 
behavior of a small firm than of a large one.) A firm may 
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have unfavorable expectations about the continuation of 
good business conditions or about its ability to resist wage 
increases. Or, in the process of planning an expansion of 
its plant facilities, it may wish to retain and even accumulate 
liquid assets as working capital and as an exhibit for the 
improvement of its standing with the banking community. 
Furthermore, where the management wishes to prevent a 
dilution of control (as in some family-dominated enter-
prises), there may be a generalized unwillingness to borrow. 
In general, then, the determination of capacity requires 
a description of the policy milieu in the economy with re-
gard to credit conditions. This will include a mention of a 
representative interest rate on short-term credit. (Pre-
sumably, a firm would not issue long-term bonds or new 
corporate stocks in order to finance a shortrun expansion, 
and it would be difficult in any case to obtain new equity 
capital during a short adjustment period because of Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission regulations and the ad-
ministrative lags associated with stock issue.) The interest 
rates in a policy milieu can be expected to affect both a 
firm's demand for loanable funds (and its ability to get 
them if the attitudes of bankers are affected by a tendency 
to treat the discount rate as a signal of future conditions and 
government policies) and also its desired asset-liability 
structure. 
The interacting adjustments of credit flows and liquid-
ity needs on the part of business firms during a general 
expansion of activity in the economic system are such that 
it seems reasonable to suppose that, if the interest rates are 
low in an expansion, then the adjustments that would take 
place would be favorable to the seeking of loanable funds 
and adverse to the holding of idle balances. Even though a 
lower interest charge has the effect of reducing the penalty 
on holding idle balances, rising prices and optimistic ex-
pectations would strongly tempt firms to use what liquid 
capital they have and to obtain more on credit. Even if it 
is believed, because of a large amount of slack in the system, 
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that the next business expansion will be characterized by 
stable prices and stable or gently rising interest rates, the 
credit factor will ordinarily become a constraining factor 
only after other constraints have also begun to operate. 
The estimation of a reasonable potential output requires 
the assumption that under plausible future business con-
ditions the level of demand would be sufficient to absorb 
that output. The consideration of demand conditions must, 
of course, take into account outlay by public authorities 
along with the demand of private buyers. 
The information (or "signals") on demand conditions 
which the firm uses in its production planning only has 
significance when viewed in terms of the de facto aspira-
tions for the firm which are held by its decision-makers 
(just as was the case with credit conditions). A firm in 
which profits tend to be maximized in the short run will 
behave differently from a firm that is attempting to maxi-
mize something else, say, market share. 
In short, capacity output has its meaning only within 
the context of a signal (such as a change in the frequency 
of orders or a change in price) or signals for changes in 
private and public demand; and the signal itself has sig-
nificance only within the context of the de facto goals of 
the firm. Decisions on the level of employment and pro-
duction arise from the targets and aspirations of plant man-
agers, as modified by the attitudes of creditors, stockholders, 
employees, and union leaders. 
The revenue and cost situation considered in capacity 
estimation is based upon input and output prices associated 
with a condition of high activity in the economy, and it is 
the comparative relationships of such prices that crucially 
affect capacity. (These relationships are affected at all times 
by the magnitude of taxation on sales, property, and in-
come, and by the prevailing method of allocating joint 
costs.) In short, the economic capacity of an industry can 
be affected by price changes alone. 
Capacity is greater to the degree that the prices of the 
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variable inputs do not tend to increase as output expands. 
That is, an estimate of capacity should be lower (or higher) 
than would otherwise be the case if prices (including wages) 
in the markets for the variable inputs cannot be expected 
to remain constant (and thus leave undisturbed the average 
total cost curve2) as output increases in the short run. 
The existence of 100 percent utilization depends upon 
the conformity of actual demand conditions to those that 
are assumed to be required to stimulate capacity-level pro-
duction in the preparation of the capacity estimate. The 
capacity of an establishment with given fixed plant and 
equipment is relative to the date upon which an expansion 
to capacity would be supposed to begin, to the price and 
wage structure associated with such an expansion, to the 
product or group of products under consideration, and to 
the motives of the establishment's high-level managers. 
One hundred percent utilization, then, is simply human 
behavior that fulfills a set of conditions. The significance 
of any one element, say plant size, as a constraint depends 
upon a number of other considerations. Plant size may not 
be a constraint if there is a materials bottleneck or a low 
level of demand. Something always constrains output; there 
is always a complete set of empirical magnitudes for the 
variables in the constraint list. Capacity estimation is con-
cerned with the role of such things as plant size as con-
straints under hypothetical circumstances where lack of 
demand is usually assumed not to be an active constraint. 
Capacity estimation is concerned with what would happen 
in the short run if demand conditions suddenly became 
more favorable. 
The magnitude of a utilization percentage for a par-
ticular date or period will vary, depending upon which of 
2 Hickman has properly noted that "changes in efficiency-in cost 
per unit of output-as output is varied along a given cost function do 
not affect capacity." Bert Hickman, "Capacity, Capacity Utilization, 
and the Acceleration Principle," in National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Problems of Capital Formation (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1957), 421. 
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four possible procedures is followed. The alternatives are 
( 1) to value both actual output and capacity output at the 
actual price ( s) existing at the date or in the period to 
which the estimate applies, (2) to value actual output at 
actual price ( s) and capacity output at the hypothetical 
price ( s) which is (are) supposed to be that (those) which 
will be associated with the next business expansion after 
the date or period to which the estimate refers, ( 3) to value 
both actual output and capacity output at the hypothetical 
price ( s ), or ( 4) to value actual output at the hypothetical 
price(s) and capacity output at the actual price(s). The first 
alternative is the most convenient. The second and third 
are meaningful, but are unworkable whenever any sub-
stantial amount of aggregation over products is involved. 
The fourth is absurd. 
As already shown, a capacity estimate for any establish-
ment or group of establishments possesses a fundamental 
relativity. This relativity can be well illustrated by consider-
ing the Eastern Kentucky coalfields. 
Any capacity estimate presupposes the concurrence with 
capacity-level production of a level of demand adequate to 
clear the estimated capacity output from the market. This 
implies either the assumption that the level of aggregate 
demand for goods and services in the economy at large 
would be such as to produce robust conditions in the market 
for the grade of coal that is mined in Eastern Kentucky or 
that, regardless of conditions in the economy at large, the 
private and public demand in this particular market would 
be high. This makes it clear that, with either of these as-
sumptions, a capacity estimate is related essentially to an 
assumed business-cycle state or public-policy environment, 
or both. It is related to the public-policy situation because 
monetary policy and public outlays are clearly ingredients 
in aggregate demand. The exact nature of the public-policy 
environment is crucial, because if government contracts for 
coal delivery are to involve cost-plus agreements or sub-
sidization (either of which might well be the case in a 
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national emergency), then the capacity estimate should be 
larger than otherwise would be the case. This is because 
such policies would permit the carrying out of marginal 
operations involving overtime charges, increased mainte-
nance costs, obsolete equipment and currently nonoptimal 
methods, and inferior veins. (The policy environment is 
also relevant insofar as it affects the cost structure of the 
coal industry by way of laws pertaining to reforestation, 
minimum wage, and collective bargaining.) 
Whenever product differentiation exists, as in the coal 
industry, the assumptions about necessary demand conditions 
which are implicit in a capacity estimate are even more 
intricate than those mentioned above. The demand for 
coal is really a structure of demands for various grades of 
coal (which are only partially substitutes for one another) 
for which there is a structure of prices. In making an 
estimate for a particular coalfield, like Eastern Kentucky, 
one is assuming a certain hypothetical level of necessary 
demand for the grade of coal mined and processed in that 
field. Technical changes in the economy, external to the 
coal industry, can change the structure of demands for the 
various grades of coal. This means that a capacity estimate 
for a particular field could be too high simply because the 
hypothetical demand for that grade of coal cannot reason-
ably be supposed to be forthcoming during any future 
expansion of production in the industry at large in view of 
technological changes in coal usage. That is to say, changes 
in the structure or level of demand for the output of the 
coal industry at large can occur which are of an adverse 
nature for a particular field. Such adverse changes can make 
a portion of the physical facilities and labor supply in that 
field irrelevant for the estimation of capacity. As far as 
the Eastern Kentucky field is concerned, adverse structural 
changes have developed for this relatively expensive grade 
of coal. 
A capacity estimate is also based on the assumption 
that there will be a continuation of some given technology 
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in the industry under consideration. For even with an as-
sumed hypothetical demand (which might in some cases 
happen to be also the actual current level of demand), the 
relevance of a particular capital equipment and labor com-
bination for capacity estimation depends upon the efficiency 
(in view of the assumed level of demand) of this combina-
tion in relation to other combinations in the industry. For 
example, the answer to the question of whether the tech-
nically possible output of a particular truck mine or pony 
mine is to be included in an industrywide or fieldwide coal-
capacity estimate has been profoundly affected by the 
emergence of strip mining and auger mining and by in-
novations in underground mining. 
The intricacy of the role of demand (and its signals: 
output price and the level of new and unfilled orders) and 
technology in a capacity estimate goes still deeper. \Vhen 
the output of an industry has substitutes, the firms in the 
industry compete not only with each other but also with 
firms in other industries. This means that technological 
changes largely external to the bulk of the production opera-
tion can change entirely the significance of equipment and 
workers, as far as capacity estimation is concerned, with no 
visible change in said equipment and workers. Technological 
improvements in competing industries adversely affect true 
economic capacity in the coal industry, and improvement in 
transportation methods (such as the development of liquid 
shipping) in the coal industry favorably affect its economic 
capacity. Similarly, the discovery of new ways of using 
coal can affect favorably the true economic capacity. 
The significance of a given facility for a capacity esti-
mate is also related to cost conditions, especially the labor 
market. This point is clearly illustrated in Eastern Kentucky, 
where the presence of unemployed workers who are willing 
and able to work at less than the union wage has permitted 
the reopening of previously closed truck mines which had 
been forced to shut down because of competition from 
highly mechanized mines. 
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Hickman regards capacity as that rate of production 
at which the management would become dissatisfied with 
the amount of its fixed plant and equipment.8 He holds 
that this output corresponds to the point of minimum aver-
age costs.4 In order for a capacity estimate, which is pre-
pared by the common (though obviously not universal) 
procedure of assuming that the estimate applies to demand 
conditions associated with cyclical peaks, to conform to Hick-
man's concept, two assumptions are required: First, at any 
time when one's estimated capacity output is actually 
achieved, managerial expectations about the continuation 
of a high level of demand must be positive (or else Hick-
man's dissatisfaction will not occur). Second, at the time 
when existing plant facilities were constructed, management 
must have anticipated correctly the demand conditions that 
would stimulate optimum utilization (i.e., production at 
minimum average cost) and are those that actually material-
ized. 
If these two assumptions are not valid in some situa-
tions, it is then possible that, except in industries where the 
coefficients of production are rigidly fixed, capacity (con-
ceived of as a peak-attainment) and Hickman's desired pro-
duction rate for given investment in fixed capital will be 
significantly different rates of operation. If, by some mis-
fortune, investment in plant and equipment has become 
highly excessive, then the establishment may never reach 
s Bert Hickman, "On a New Method of Capacity Estimation," 
Journal of the American Statistical Association, LIX (June 1964), 
529-49. 
4 This assertion has the appearance of contradicting his earlier 
statement (in "Capacity, Capacity Utilization," 420) that "the ques· 
tion posed [for capacity research] is this: How much physical output 
can be produced with a given plant under a normal organization of 
production and with an uninterrupted and unlimited flow of variable 
inputs?" However, a careful examination of this quotation reveals that 
the maximal output referred to here would in fact be the desired output 
level that management had in mind when building the plant in the 
first place. This resolves the apparent contradiction, because such a 
desired output level will be at, or very close to, the minimum point 
on the average cost curve. 
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a level of production where management is dissatisfied (in 
the sense of wanting more) with the size of its plant.5 In 
this case, any capacity estimate based on plausible future 
demand conditions will necessarily be less than Hickman's 
desired rate of operation. 
Furthermore, if business conditions are good and im-
proving, the managers may become dissatisfied with the 
amount of fixed facilities at an output that is less than 
capacity (as defined with reference to peak-level market 
conditions). That is, dissatisfaction may occur before the 
peak of a cyclical expansion is reached, as Hickman's work 
has shown. In other words, output often can continue to in-
crease in the short run after the decision to invest in a plant 
expansion and can be sustained at a level higher than the 
investment-inducing level until the new facilities are ef-
fectively installed. If expectations are favorable, a positive 
decision on net investment in fixed facilities may be reached 
as soon as output rises, or is expected to rise, to a point 
where the same level of output could be produced more 
profitably with a larger plant and the divisibility of the 
equipment permits the construction of additional facilities 
in an amount that is appropriate either to existing or to 
expected conditions of demand and cost. 
In short, if one wishes to conceive of capacity as an 
output that could be sustained rationally in the short run 
in a plausible market-demand situation, then his capacity 
estimates will under some circumstances be different from 
Hickman's estimates for the same list of establishments. 
High utilization is not a necessary condition for the 
occurrence of a positive decision on net investment, since 
this investment may take place as part of a modernization 
program, as part of a firm's entry into new products, or as 
part of a firm's response in its long-range planning to its 
expectations about cyclical fluctuation, government policy, 
5 This overinvestment situation can come about either because 
future demand is overestimated or future variable costs are under-
estimated by the management. 
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population changes, changes in consumer tastes, and tech-
nological innovations. Furthermore, high utilization is only 
a sufficient condition for the occurrence of net investment 
if expectations are good (as to the continuation of high 
demand and tolerable labor costs), recent experience with 
excess capacity has not been highly unfavorable, and high 
utilization is sustained for a sufficient period of weeks or 
months to be favorably impressive to the management. 
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2 
PROBLEMS OF 
AGGREGATION AND COMPARISON 
UN ORDER to carry out a useful aggregation of an 
economy's capacity to produce an individual product, three 
conditions must be fulfilled. First, the implied demands for 
labor and materials must be consistent at the capacity level 
of production. Second, the output at the aggregated capacity 
level of production must be adequate in quality to meet 
buyer's requirements. Finally, it must be reasonable to 
suppose that market conditions are likely to develop under 
which there will exist a level of demand adequate to clear 
such an output from the market. This last condition be-
comes a crucial consideration if great duplication of facilities 
has developed in an industry because of product differentia-
tion or poor investment planning. 
Whenever the estimation of capacity concerns establish-
ments with diversified outputs, it is necessary to have some 
knowledge of the proportions in which the various goods 
would be produced under conditions of full capacity-
utilization. For example, will a food processor continue to 
produce cheese, ice cream, and powdered milk in their 
present proportions, or in some other proportions? Except 
in situations of national emergency or of rapidly developing 
changes in consumer preference, the simplest and best as-
sumption is that the proportions in the line of products will 
remain unchanged except for normal seasonal adjustments. 
Furthermore, whenever some product is an intermediate 
good, it is likely that the ratio of this output to the others 
would remain fairly constant during a general expansion. 
When the outputs of an establishment have no technical 
complementarity in their use or consumption, their relative 
amounts are more likely to be flexible. 
Sometimes it is not plausible to specify unchanging 
output proportions. For a firm that has a line of products 
which it produces on job orders with highly convertible 
equipment, capacity estimation can only apply to the total 
value of output, which is taken as the indicator of the firm's 
activity level. 
In the event of a rapidly changing consumer-preference 
or technological pattern, capacity is overstated if the method 
of allocating joint costs in multiplant and multiple-product 
firms producing the affected products has become inap-
propriate in the sense of allocating too small a share of 
joint costs to the recently more important products. 
Whenever an aggregative product category contains 
the output of some industry, A, and some other industry, B, 
where B's output is an input for A, the validity of an ag-
gregative capacity estimate depends upon whether the man-
agers in A and B have reasonably similar expectations about 
the price and volume of B's output in the future. (Value-
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added estimates are preferable to gross-value estimates here.) 
An aggregative estimate may involve either a single and 
undifferentiated product which is put out by single-product 
establishments, or a group of products produced only at 
single-product establishments, or a group of products where 
any or all are manufactured at multiple-product establish-
ments. But, in any case, the individual quantities, q, or 
values, pq, cannot be aggregated unless these addends can 
be reconciled as to their implications about resource require-
ments and about interindustry coordination.1 
There is no unique system for classifying products. 
Product groupings may be defined on the basis of similarity 
of raw inputs, similarity of uses for the outputs, similarity 
of production processes, technical complementarity of the 
outputs, or institutional market groupings. The general 
criterion in forming categories is to make them as sensitive 
as possible to structural changes in the economy, to the 
exact location in the economy of bottlenecks which could 
constrain or are constraining a general expansion, and to 
differential cyclical patterns of capacity change. 
There are three requirements to be fulfilled in order to 
compare in an unqualified way the capacity estimates for 
two different dates. Strict comparability requires the defini-
tion of the estimates for the two dates with reference to 
( 1) roughly the same structure of relative prices, ( 2) the 
same list of goods (except for changes in the output of 
multiple-use equipment in establishments with large lines 
of products), and ( 3) the same institutional system, that 
is, the patterns of business organization and motivation. 
1 The construction of such an inventory of resource requirements 
often necessitates adding up the money values of various specific inputs. 
The prices that are used in forming these money-value aggregates are 
assumed to be those that would be associated with economically 
rational production of a hypothetical capacity output. For a basic study 
of the problem of input aggregation, see L. R. Klein, "Macroeconomics 
and the Theory of Rational Behavior," Econometrica, XIV (April 
1946), 93-108. 
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Because of the impossibility of constructing rigorously 
a proper set of purely hypothetical weights representing the 
pattern of private preferences or public policy goals during 
a future business expansion, it is necessary to use empirically 
derived weights in the construction of aggregative capacity 
indexes. The significance of capacity weights based on his-
torical production data is affected by any actual or expected 
changes in the structure of private or public demand.2 For 
example, production weights based on historical percentage-
shares of aggregate value may fail in a study of a structural 
transition from peace to war. In this situation, the concern 
is not merely with a change over time in an index with 
actual-value weights, but with changes in relative capacities. 
Relevant changes in capacity, as the economy moves toward 
the pattern of production expected after the transition, will 
not be reflected properly in an index using historical weights. 
Alternative weighting schemes have definite differential 
effects upon the behavior of production indexes.3 
Capacity estimation is in essence an inference about what 
would probably happen if a given stock of fixed plant and 
equipment were to exist under alternative and hypothetical 
market conditions that might develop in the future. This 
means that capacity estimates are inevitably subject to 
random errors because of the simplifying assumptions that 
are required concerning utilization at the previous peak in 
production, managerial goals, the rate of effective installa-
tion of new equipment, and the smoothness of the time-
distribution of productivity changes. And, of course, capacity 
estimates are affected by such universal sources of error as 
incomplete data and computational mistakes and by formula 
bias in index number comparisons. 
2 A classic study of proper weighting for a capacity index is Henry 
Villard, "Some Aspects of the Concept of Capacity to Produce," 
Review of Economics and Statistics, XXI (Feb. 1939), 13-20. 
s See, for example, U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, Industrial Production, 19 59 Revision (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1960), 1-74. 
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But capacity estimates are also affected by systematic 
errors that tend to be generated by the various methods of 
estimation themselves. Systematic errors (or, more rigor-
ously, systematic differences with other estimates) arise in 
capacity's estimation whenever a method fails to take a 
full account of, or deliberately excludes from consideration, 
one or more of the constraints upon shortrun output ex-
pansion. If the full effect of a constraint is underrated or 
ignored, capacity will be overstated, while if a constraint 
is exaggerated, capacity will be understated. More specifi-
cally, method-induced systematic errors are created whenever 
an estimation method either fails to allow for the effects of 
changes in general economic conditions upon the feasibility 
of higher levels of production, or uses a definition of capacity 
or an estimation procedure that causes disproportionate 
relative emphasis on the various constraints. 
It is possible at this point to note that the analysis thus far 
has made it possible to generalize some of the difficulties 
that beset attempts to estimate potential GNP (where the 
difference between this and actual GNP is presumed to be a 
measure of slack or waste in the economic system) as fol-
lows: 
1. Any estimate of potential GNP implies an assumed 
structure of relative output prices, which may or may 
not be the same as that associated with actual GNP. 
This proposition has several corollaries, as follows: 
2. The aggregate level of prices associated with potential 
GNP may not be the same as that associated with actual 
GNP. 
3. Furthermore, sophisticated contemporary estimates 
of potential GNP usually involve an explicit statement 
of the amount of inflation that would be expected to 
be associated with a shortrun movement of the economic 
system to potential GNP. 
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4. The existence of a gap between potential and actual 
GNP does not necessarily imply the existence of a tradi-
tional Keynesian deflationary gap. The absence of such 
a rigorous correspondence can be largely explained by 
a multitude of ways in which the economy deviates 
from perfect competition in addition to Keynesian down-
ward wage-rigidity. 
5. Since changes in price structure imply changes in 
weighting, movements along the income axis in the 
textbook Keynesian equilibrium diagram can only be 
used to represent the direction of static forces and can-
not be said to represent historical movement whenever 
such movement involves a change in price structure, 
because, with the implied change in value-weights, the 
meaning of the income axis itself changes. 
6. Even if one assumes that no changes in value-weights 
are involved in a movement along an income axis toward 
a full employment point in a deflationary gap diagram, 
this point is ambiguous with respect to the size of the 
labor force, since the actual labor force and the potential 
labor force cannot be safely assumed to be the same 
thing.4 
4 Two representative studies on the question of potential GNP 
are Arthur M. Okun, "The Gap Between Actual and Potential Out· 
put," in The Battle Against Unemployment, ed. Arthur M. Okun 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1965), 13-22, and Edwin Kuh, "Measure-
ment of Potential Output," American Economic Review, LVI (Sept. 
1966), 758-76. 
21 
3 
EXAMPLES OF 
ESTIMATION PROBLEMS 
SUP POSE that early in 1964 a certain Commerce Depart-
ment official receives information that the Kennedy Round 
negotiations in Geneva are to bring about a great reduction 
of tariffs on several imports into the Common Market from 
the rest of the world. He notes that one of the categories 
to be affected is rolled photographic film for still prints. 
He wishes to estimate the ability of some particular Ameri-
can corporation to respond quickly to this future expansion 
of its market. 
Now, suppose that he obtains the annual reports and 
other publications of this firm and finds to his good fortune 
that he has separate data for the firm's roll film division. 
After a careful study of this material, he establishes the 
following pertinent facts. 
In its roll film plant the firm manufactures two sizes 
of film with two different photographic speeds. Since each 
type is produced in both a black-and-white and a color 
variety, the firm thus produces a total of eight individual 
film products. The eight varieties are produced more or 
less continuously, although they are all produced with the 
same equipment, which is perfectly convertible from one 
use to another. An implication of this is that the eight 
types of film production are competing uses for the equip-
ment. This fact does not disturb the investigator however, 
because he expects that the impending widening of the 
market will not require any marked change from the pro-
portions in which the eight kinds of film are presently 
produced. 
He finds that in 1962 the average productivity of this 
firm's fixed capital in its roll film division was higher than 
at any period in the history of this establishment. He notes 
that during that year the depreciated book value of the 
plant and equipment in this division was $10,000,000 and 
that the company has always followed a policy of con-
tinuous replacement and maintenance by immediately plow-
ing depreciation funds back into the plant. He also finds 
that during 1962 the firm made a net addition to its floor 
space and equipment in this division. This net investment 
amounted to $300,000. Although this was not effectively 
installed until very late in 1962, the investment decision 
had been made in 1961 when the climate of business ex-
pectations had been better than it was in 1962. (We are 
assuming no price-changes for capital goods.) 
He takes pains to note that certain small but significant 
innovations were contained in the new equipment and that 
these were also present in the equipment installed since 
then on an ordinary replacement basis. This fact is im-
portant, because he will use the average productivity of 
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capital goods for 1962 as the basis for his first approximation 
of 1965 capacity, in that he will apply the 1962 productivity 
ratio to the expected stock of fixed capital for 1965. The 
presence of the innovations will cause the first approxima-
tion to understate the capacity of the establishment. 
He observes that the establishment has experienced a 
slump since 1962, as the following facts demonstrate. Dur-
ing 1962, with an average total employment of 1,200 people 
working in a plant worth $10,000,000, the establishment 
produced an output worth $7,800,000,1 net of the value of 
input shipments from other divisions of the corporation 
and from other firms. In 1963, 1,100 employees working 
with a fixed-capital stock worth $10,300,000 produced only 
$7,500,000 worth of value-added output. 
He finds a company proclamation to the effect that, 
at current rates, production in this division in 1964 will 
be only $6,000,000 and average weekly employment only 
950 people. Since no net investment or disinvestment has 
taken place since 1962, the value of the plant is $10,300,000 
(in current prices). Since no new construction, on the one 
hand, or reduction of replacement and maintenance, on 
the other, is anticipated, and since no severe inflation is 
expected, he may assume that the plant will have this same 
value in 1965. 
An application of the plant's 1962 coefficient of fixed-
capital productivity, 78:100, to the expected 1965 stock of 
fixed capital, $10,300,000 worth, yields a first approximation 
for 1965 capacity of $8,034,000 of value-added. Similarly, 
using the 1962 ratio of capital to labor, 10,000,000 dollars : 
1,200 workers, on the expected 1965 stock of fixed capital 
gives an estimated average employment of 1,236 for 1965 
if capacity is fully utilized. 
Now, without laboring the hypothetical arithmetic any 
1 In a multiple-product case of this kind, economic value is 
preferable as a measure of output for our purposes over such measures 
as the number of physical units produced, weight of the output, or 
the spatial dimensions of shipments. 
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further, let us note some of the additional factors that our 
Department of Commerce official must take into account 
if he wishes to refine the 1965 estimate by successive ap-
proximations. 
The velocity of operation physically possible for most 
of the equipment used in roll film manufacturing is so 
great that from a practical standpoint it might as well be 
infinite-a conclusion that is based on engineering estimates 
and on the fact that the more dexterous and ambitious 
workers produce at rates far above the average. An implica-
tion of this fact is that the main origins of inadaptability 
in this kind of production are: the human limitations of the 
average worker; the inability of the firm to provide better 
incentives; the departmental differences in shift conditions, 
which are such that although some departments work only 
two shifts while the departments that feed these depart-
ments work three, and three-shift departments could not, 
without more equipment and men, keep up if the two-shift 
departments added a third shift; and the extensive 
machinery-cleaning and output-handling requirements in 
the one- and two-shift departments, where these require-
ments are such that the maintenance workers, who work 
during the "down" hours, would greatly hamper the work 
of the operators during an extra shift. Thus, while some 
ordinary overtime work might be possible, the probability of 
large increases in employment after all equipment has been 
brought into regular use is very low; in spite of the high 
adaptability of each machine to a more intense usage, the 
adaptability of the establishment at large to new employ-
ment in the form of new shifts is low. For this reason, the 
estimated capacity is probably appropriate on the basis of 
adaptability considerations. 
Another reason for thinking that the estimate should 
not be revised upward is that while the equipment used in 
roll film manufacturing is highly convertible (from one type 
of film production to another, though, of course, not from 
one stage to another), outright substitution of materials is 
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impossible (with trivial exceptions). Furthermore, the 
tolerance of the roll film market for downward changes in 
the quality of output is quite low. 
However, the innovations mentioned earlier (regard-
ing the equipment installed since 1961) have the effect of 
making the estimated capacity an understatement. This 
requires a small upward revision of the estimate. Such a 
revision would also be required if there were any evidence 
of a substantial underutilization during 1962 (the productiv-
ity reference-year). 
As for the reorganizational implications of the capacity 
estimate and the time period that would be required to reach 
such an annual rate of production, it seems reasonable to 
suppose that, if the European tariff reduction were ac-
complished in late 1964, say November, then the capacity 
rate of production could be achieved within four or five 
months. 
The estimate is, of course, slightly too low to the extent 
that output prices for roll film may be expected to rise dur-
ing the period to which the estimate applies. That is, if 
demand is increasing in the domestic market in such a way 
that the firm could successfully command a higher price on 
each product, and if it could maintain this price in the face 
of foreign competition in the new free-trade situation, then 
the shortrun profit-maximizing output is shifted to a higher 
level. The possible increase will be slight, however, because 
of the previously mentioned low adaptability of the equip-
ment to additional amounts of labor after regular-use is 
achieved. 
The estimate is too high to the extent that the firm 
will face higher input prices, especially wages. It is also 
too high to the degree that either credit conditions or the 
firm's financial position is unfavorable (although neither 
of these is likely to affect the typical large corporation 
negatively under business conditions which are generally 
favorable). 
Suppose that our hypothetical public official wishes to 
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aggregate his estimate for this company, say Company A, 
with similar estimates for the other companies in this 
industry, say Company B and Company C. He is careful 
not to proceed by simply totaling the value-added of the 
three companies, because, in the first place, he notes that 
each produces goods other than rolled films, and, in the 
second place, he finds that the lines of products are not 
identical anyway. A is unique among the three in that it 
produces industrial chemicals not only for its own use but 
also for the market. B has a line of optical equipment with 
which A and C, though they manufacture cameras, do not 
compete. C has a national monopoly in flat film and indoor 
lighting equipment. With all this in mind, the official makes 
estimates only for the roll film establishment or division 
within each firm, and by this he confines himself to a 
sufficiently specific and consistent line of products. He 
takes care to see that the individual estimates for each 
establishment can be reconciled with one another as to 
their implied input requirements and as to the effective 
coordination of intraindustry shipments of intermediate 
products (since he knows that B and C buy large quantities 
of chemicals from A). 
Since the tautology that capacity is the output which an 
establishment can produce may be interpreted in a variety 
of ways, there are a number of distinct concepts of capacity 
which are in use by economists, businessmen, and others. 
The model developed in the two previous chapters affirms 
the logical possibility of a multiplicity of capacity concepts, 
since it shows that a definite concept of capacity requires 
a specification of values for an entire list of variables. The 
diversity of concepts sometimes has been a source of un-
necessary controversy, especially about alleged differences 
between efficiency and maximization, and so it is worth-
while to examine briefly some of the concepts of economic 
capacity. 
For example, de Leeuw has recognized three significant 
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concepts of economic capacity.2 They are based on different 
terms. One has the schedule of production as its frame 
of reference, another is defined in terms of behavior of 
average costs, and the third is based on the behavior of 
marginal costs. 
The first concept is developed from an idea of normal 
practice. Normal practice is thought of as the manpower 
and scheduling arrangement which has been typical of recent 
peaceful and prosperous years. Output under this schedule is 
thought of as capacity. As de Leeuw points out, the sig-
nificance of such a capacity output is hard to assess, for 
full utilization of normal-practice capacity might sometimes 
involve pressure for new investment, while under other 
conditions it might be carried on without generating de-
cisions for net capital formation. A distinguishing feature 
of this type of concept is that level-of-utilization is defined 
on the basis of the time-in-use of inputs rather than on 
the basis of the physical quantities of the inputs or the 
cost of drawing flows of services from them. Some number 
of hours of utilization is simply designated as full utilization; 
capacity is then the output associated with this work 
schedule under normal conditions of productivity. 
A second way to construe the term capacity, according 
to de Leeuw, is in terms of efficient operation-more pre-
cisely, as the minimum point on a shortrun average total 
cost curve. The same difficulty occurs with this concept as 
with the normal-practice approach, as de Leeuw recognizes. 
Some industries may experience pressure for net investment 
immediately when operation is at capacity, while others 
may not until output is well beyond capacity. 
The third concept recognized by de Leeuw appears 
to be an original one.3 He proposes to define capacity as 
2 Frank de Leeuw, "The Concept of Capacity," in American 
Statistical Association, 1961 Proceedings of the Business and Economic 
Statistics Section (Washington: American Statistical Association, 
1961)' 324-25. 
a Ibid. 
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that output for which shortrun marginal costs are x percent 
above current minimum shortrun average total costs, where 
x would be determined by the excess that empirical evidence 
would indicate to be necessary to exert an impact on the 
capital goods industries. With this definition, a rate of 
utilization at or near 100 percent would necessarily be a 
precursor of net investment. This concept has the ad-
vantage, as he notes, of making it clear that a workable 
concept of capacity must embody not one but several 
shortrun limitations upon the level of production. These 
are the constraints created by fixed plant, the labor force 
(employed and available), and the availability of materials 
and credit. (These constraints, of course, are only significant 
with reference to definite managerial goals and expecta-
tions.) 
Zabel sees a different kind of plurality of capacity con-
cepts.4 For him the diversity is created by the attempt to 
specify an estimation procedure. He recognizes three types 
of estimates, where the classification is based on the level 
of aggregation involved in the estimate and the use to be 
made of it. These categories are ( 1) estimates for a single 
establishment or for a group of establishments making up 
an industry; ( 2) estimates for all establishments in a na-
tional economy, with due account taken of the interde-
pendencies associated with simultaneous high level produc-
tion by all these units; and ( 3) estimates made for an 
economy or sector thereof by using the relationship between 
output and new investment which is contained in some 
econometric model of investment behavior. Now, while 
these three approaches are not necessarily inconsistent, a 
careful enumeration of the constraints that an estimator 
has in mind when he chooses an approach would show that 
all three approaches can involve different concepts of what 
capacity is. Zabel notes that at first glance they respectively 
4 Edward Zabel, "Concepts and Measurements of Productive 
Capacity" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 
1956), 17 ff. 
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suggest the ideas of ( 1) maximization of output, ( 2) ef-
ficient production in a general equilibrium of the national 
economy, and ( 3) an investment-trigger rate of production. 
One reason for the multiplicity of concepts is that the 
idea of capacity has been used in the economic literature 
in substantially different kinds of arguments. Diverse sets 
of connotations, each of which may be appropriate in a 
particular argument, tend to lurk as an unnoticed source of 
confusion. It is sometimes uncertain whether a writer or 
speaker is thinking of the maximum physical capability of 
a fixed input, or of any possible output for a given stock of 
plant and equipment, or of the optimum output for an 
establishment, or of the output obtainable under some kind 
of emergency scheduling, or of something else. That dif-
ferent kinds of research involve different usages of the term 
capacity becomes especially clear if one ponders the distinc-
tions between excess capacity resulting from imperfections 
in competition, unused capacity that is necessary for flexibil-
ity because of seasonal or erratic fluctuations, unused capacity 
resulting from a serious recession, and idle capacity result-
ing from obsolescence. 
In this connection, it is interesting to speculate on what 
a manufacturer means by capacity when he says that he is 
operating at less than capacity. He does not ordinarily 
mean the maximum physical product of his fixed capital, 
although in some cases this may not be far from what he 
has in mind. Nor is he likely to be thinking of output at 
economic equilibrium under current conditions, for he is 
inclined to speculate about the possibilities for his plant 
under hypothetical conditions of market demand. In view 
of the fact that he probably holds fairly definite expectations 
about future input costs, the point which he probably 
thinks of as full capacity is that output beyond which 
average total costs would increase sharply. It is of course 
partly determined by his expectations about the way factor 
prices would behave under an increased demand for them. 
It is important to note that, in spite of the conflicting 
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connotations carried by the term capacity, a common theme 
is often present in the term's usage. It is the idea that 
capacity is a rate of production which could be attained 
rationally under certain hypothetical conditions. It is an 
output level that is constrained by existing goals and recog-
nizable bottlenecks. 
It is also important to note that in capacity research 
there is no basis for a categorical distinction between max-
imization and optimization. Human behavior is always 
subject to constraints (Pareto's les obstacles) and driven 
by motives that are expressable as a pattern of preferences 
(Pareto's les gouts5). That which maximizes goal attain-
ment also economizes. 
Students of capacity sometimes make a distinction 
between a maximal concept of capacity and an optimal 
concept. But what really lies under this distinction is not 
any inherent difference between maximization and optimiza-
tion, but rather a difference in the conditions (of market 
demand and cost of variable inputs) which are assumed to 
be associated with capacity-level production. 
A questionnaire survey on capacity may be said to be open-
ended if the questionnaire does not provide a definition of 
capacity for the respondent to use; that is, if it allows each 
respondent to use a concept which to him seems appropriate. 
The McGraw-Hill sample survey is an example of this.6 
This project has grown out of an attempt to explain in-
vestment behavior, and its data are simply numbers indicat-
ing what plant managers think capacity is. It appears that 
the respondents in this survey usually think of capacity as 
the maximum output obtainable with normal work sched-
ules, and that they have a preferred rate of operation which 
5 Vilfredo Pareto, Manuel d'economie politique (Paris: Marcel 
Giard, 1927), passim. 
6 Margaret Matulis, "Capacity and Operating Rates," in American 
Statistical Association, 1961 Proceedings of the Business and Economic 
Statistics Section (Washington: American Statistical Association, 1961), 
306-308. 
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is a little less than this. Since the McGraw-Hill investigators 
are more concerned with relative changes in capacity over 
time than with the actual magnitude of capacity, it is more 
important for each firm in the sample to be consistent in 
its definition as time passes than for all firms to use the 
same definition. In any case, since McGraw-Hill cannot 
compel a company to respond, the investigators believe that 
the number of responses would decrease if the questionnaire 
specified a concept of capacity. They work under the con-
viction that a large response to a vague question is more 
useful than a small response to a precise question, especially 
since the sample is not drawn randomly from a preestablished 
frame (i.e., list of the entire population of firms). This is 
important, since the frequency-distributions of establishment-
capacities for the various industries are not known. 
The fact that the McGraw-Hill survey is not based on 
a random sample needs to be stressed. It is not possible to 
compute a sampling error from the means of the random 
samples of a given size which could be drawn from the 
population, since these samples have not been drawn. And 
since the standard deviation for the entire population is 
not known, it is furthermore not possible to attach any 
particular significance to the shape or dispersion of the 
frequency distribution of the sample that is used. On top 
of this the data used by McGraw-Hill in constructing ag-
gregative utilization percentages have been drawn from two 
different sources, the McGraw-Hill questionnaire and a 
Federal Reserve survey of production, which are based 
on nonequivalent lists of firms. 
The McGraw-Hill questionnaire requests that the com-
panies in the sample report only net increases in capacity 
and that these increases represent acquisition of "brand 
new" facilities (so that purchases of used equipment will 
not affect the estimates). However, there are other sources 
of error with which it is not so easy to cope, as the McGraw-
Hill researchers recognize. For example, one cannot be sure 
that a respondent will include the effects of productivity-
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increasing improvements that exist in machinery bought 
simply to replace old equipment. Also, replacement equip-
ment is to some degree really a net addition anyway if the 
firm continues to use occasionally its "replaced" equipment 
(which can happen if the old equipment is merely obsolete 
and not worn out). Furthermore, a movement into a new 
line of goods might be reported as an increase in capacity 
with no concurrent increase in the firm's fixed capital or 
employment. 
In general, there are reasons for a good deal of 
pessimism about the probable success of questionnaire 
surveys on capacity, even when they are not open-ended. 
While it is true that the Annual Survey of Manufactures 
(or some other sample survey based on as comprehensive 
a frame) could be adapted so that all respondents would 
be confronted with questions on capacity, the estimates re-
ceived would often not have any reasonable degree 
of accuracy or significance. It is true that the questionnaire 
used in the Annual Survey gets information on the kind of 
statistical items that would have to be mentioned in a 
capacity questionnaire, especially if it is not open-ended. 
But it deals with these variables (such as inventory be-
havior, outlay for plant and equipment, energy consumed, 
materials consumed, book value of assets, employment, man-
hours, and value of shipments) as historical facts and not 
as conjectured magnitudes which are part of a hypothetical 
business situation. I seriously question whether the respond-
ents in this and other manufacturing surveys have at hand 
the information that is necessary for them to make useful 
estimates of their future behavior, especially in terms of 
aggregatable estimates. In 1920 and 1923 the Census of 
Manufactures included questions on capacity but failed to 
get good responses or, in some cases, any response at all, 
and the effort was subsequently abandoned. 
There are other reasons for pessimism about the ability 
of respondents to give the kind of information required. In 
the first place, the concept of capacity can only be made 
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successfully operational in a questionnaire survey if each 
respondent is conscious of the thought process by which 
he makes his decisions on the level and content of pro-
duction (since only then can he carefully estimate his be-
havior in a hypothetical situation) and if this thought 
process remains fairly stable as time passes. Furthermore, a 
researcher may have a concept of capacity which is not 
operational (as far as questionnaire surveys are concerned) 
because of being too complicated for the respondent to 
use. That is, the respondent may not be trained to carry 
out the calculations required. He may be unwilling, or 
even conceivably unable, to incur the cost of the computa-
tions. And he may be uncertain about what the productivity 
of his inputs would be under the more intense usage coming 
with expanded operation and about whether the behavior of 
his input markets during the hypothetical expansion would 
actually conform to the assumptions he is told to make 
or must make himself in order that he may arrive at his 
estimate. 
The National Industrial Conference Board estimates of 
capacity are computed from output and capital-stock data 
which are tabulated jointly as capital-output ratios.7 Capacity 
is defined as the output that will trigger investment outlays 
which are directly for the purpose of making net additions 
to the level of output. One-hundred percent utilization is 
regarded as being the equivalent of the McGraw-Hill pre-
ferred operating rate. 
The NICB procedure has been to construct a capital-
output ratio (for fixed capital only) for each of twenty-eight 
industry groups for some year of virtually full utilization of 
capacity. This year is referred to as a base-year or bench-
mark. The ratio so constructed is then applied to the stock 
of fixed capital in later periods to estimate capacity in those 
periods; that is, if fixed capital for a particular period is 
7 Daniel Creamer, Recent Changes in Manufacturing Capacity 
(New York: National Industrial Conference Board, 1962). 
34 
placed in the numerator of the fraction, then capacity is 
the unknown in the denominator which wi11 preserve the 
value of the capital-output ratio constructed for the base-
year. 
There are a couple of points of logic concerning the 
use of capital-output ratios in estimating capacity which 
need to be made clear at this point. No matter how care-
fu11y one compiles independent evidence to show that a 
certain benchmark year was a period of virtua11y fu11 utiliza-
tion, ultimately he is assuming rather than demonstrating 
that this was so. Thus, capital-output-ratio methods rea11y 
beg the question of estimation. One can use a capital-
output ratio to estimate capacity in a given period only if 
he accepts the rate of production during the base-year as a 
definition of the capacity of the stock of fixed capital during 
the base period, or more precisely the capacity of the estab-
lishments having that capital stock. Furthermore, since a 
capacity estimate is associated with an assumed milieu of 
business conditions, it must further be assumed that business 
conditions can hardly be expected ever to be much better 
than they were during the base period. 
This last point means that the application of a capital-
output ratio for a benchmark year to the capital stock for 
another year, with due account taken of net investment and 
of changes in the value of the capital stock, cannot, strictly 
speaking, be said to measure potential output. While this 
gives a rough indication of the constraining effects of the 
stock of fixed capital, it must be remembered that a capital-
output ratio as measured at a previous peak in business 
activity is merely a historical fact. An output computed 
from that ratio and a more recent stock of capital can be 
said to represent potential output only if the same configura-
tion of relative costs and prices is expected to exist during 
the next expansion, and if due account has been taken of 
the effects of changes in technology, capital-goods prices, 
and the capital-labor ratio upon the significance of the 
capital-output ratio. 
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It would, of course, be exceedingly difficult, if not 
impossible, to specify a complete set of consistent hypo-
thetical prices (with which one could rigorously assign a 
value to a capacity output) which would define the profit 
situation that would induce full utilization. This is true 
even if one simply takes prices at the previous peak to be 
the hypothetical set. But a capacity estimate only has its 
meaning with reference to some fairly definite structure 
of input and output prices. The conclusion which arises 
then is that in interpreting a capacity estimate, it is im-
portant to remember that it does not represent an output 
which would be feasible under all possible contingencies of 
cost and revenue. 
One experimental capacity index (prepared by the staff of 
the Federal Reserve Board) which was apparently based on 
an engineering concept tended to involve higher values for 
capacity, lower utilization percentages, and greater propor-
tional changes in capacity than other estimates.8 The sample 
of comparisons was too small to permit generalization, but 
if this was in fact a general tendency it may have been the 
result of a possible characteristic deemphasis of the roles of 
profitability constraints (and managerial goals in general) 
in the engineering concept of capacity. 
If machine ratings are to be used in preparing a capacity 
estimate, some criterion must be established for dealing 
with idle machinery. Generally speaking, this means that 
some speculation must be made in each case as to whether 
a particular piece of equipment could be operated economi-
cally under the hypothetical conditions that are assumed in 
making the capacity estimate. Furthermore, if the estimate 
is to involve aggregation of products produced on multi-
purpose equipment, then either the nature of the allocation 
of machine-time must be taken into account or there must 
be an awareness of the fact that "aggregate-value" capacity 
s De Leeuw, "The Concept of Capacity," 321, and Creamer, 
Recent Changes, 41. 
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and total "individual-product" capacity may not accord 
with each other. 
Care must always be taken to account for any peculiarities 
in particular industries as to scheduling, scheduling possibil-
ities, and seasonality. 
Nourse and his associates in a Brookings project9 added 
work scheduling as a variable in computing their practical 
capacity ( vs. rated capacity) for those industries where 
feasible alternatives existed with respect to scheduling. For 
example, capacity for anthracite coal production was com-
puted on the basis of a 304- as well as a 274-day work-year. 
If an industry traditionally operates for only part of 
the year (as is the case in some lines of food canning) or 
at least experiences, as a matter of routine, great seasonal 
fluctuations in employment and production (as is the case 
in retailing, tourism, and some other service industries), 
then it is necessary to estimate the industry's capacity with 
this in mind. It would not make sense to estimate the 
number of crates of spinach that a cannery could put out 
working on a full-time, twelve-month schedule, for such a 
number would have no relation to what might actually be 
produced under conceivable circumstances. 
In general, the capacity of an industry depends upon 
the time-distribution of demand in that industry. An in-
dustry may be able to increase its economic capacity simply 
by inducing its customers to distribute their demands more 
evenly; or conversely, the economic capacity of an industry 
may be reduced if customers suddenly insist on concentrat-
ing their demand in certain time intervals. 
Since production ordinarily involves a multiplicity of different 
facilities, the significance of unused equipment is not always 
clear. Unused equipment is not necessarily excessive equip-
ment, since in order for the production of a good or service 
9 Edwin G. Nourse and others, America's Capacity to Produce 
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1934), esp. 18-28. 
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to proceed efficiently and without disruption it may be 
necessary for a particular component to be idle from time 
to time. For example, in railroading, capacity is affected by 
miles of track, number of terminals, tractive capacity of 
locomotives, and rated capacity of the rolling stock, and it 
is doubtful that the balance of these facilities would ever 
be such as to leave them all in use all of the time. It is 
especially important in examining a multiproduct establish-
ment not to label unused facilities automatically as excess 
capacity. In such establishments it is unlikely that the 
pattern of demand, time-distribution of orders, and con-
vertibility of facilities would ever be such that all equipment 
would be in use simultaneously. The balance of facilities 
is simply not that perfect. Furthermore, in an industry 
whose output is essentially a service (as in, say, the provision 
of offstreet parking), the ability to give a high quality of 
service may actually depend upon the existence of a per-
manent pool of idle equipment or space, even though m-
dividual facilities may rotate in and out of this pool. 
While we say that an establishment has such-and-such 
capacity at a given instant, it must be remembered that 
capacity is not an immediately achievable output and that 
the time period which one would mean to allow for adjust-
ments is in fact one of the constraints. Moving up to a 
capacity output, in the event that the business situation 
changes so as to make this a rational output, would require 
time and possibly some outright reorganization. It seems 
that during the depths of a recession the necessary adjust-
ment period and the reorganizational requirements for reach-
ing even an optimal (i.e., minimum average total cost) 
output might be rather substantial. There would be ad-
ministrative delays; redirection of some input-flows might 
be necessary; and price changes might have to occur in the 
market in order to induce a movement toward capacity in 
any case. 
The time needed and the reorganization required to 
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reach capacity varies throughout the business cycle, since 
the discrepancy between capacity and actual output varies. 
Capacity, as estimated by currently practiced methods of 
peak-forward extrapolation, while it may represent an in-
vestment-trigger level of output, does not for any highly 
technical industry in the depths of a recession represent a 
quickly achievable alternative output level. The assumed 
adjustment period in such a case must be taken to be rather 
lengthy, say forty-five to ninety days. 
Two important questions regarding the validity of a trend 
line for capacity which is drawn from a previous peak in 
production (and sloped according to some known or as-
sumed time-rate and time-pattern of net fixed-capital in-
vestment, effectively installed) are whether or not the peak 
output represents full utilization and whether, in any case, 
it involves the same degree of capacity utilization as do 
other peak outputs. To the extent that utilization is not 
full at the peak, capacity so estimated is understated. To the 
extent that peaks vary as to the degree of utilization, the 
capacity estimates are unreliable. Note, however, that these 
propositions assume that there is some additional measure 
of capacity. 
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4 
THE LOGIC 
OF CAPACITY ESTIMATION 
{JT IS important to have reasonable assurance that an 
argument about economic capacity is logically complete; 
that is, that it takes into account all the variables that are 
in the conceptual model which is implied by the definition 
of capacity. The following discussion is devoted to an 
examination of this question. 
A capacity output for a manufacturing firm is de-
termined by placing successive restrictions upon the set of 
all positive, rational, integral, and finite numbers, where 
any number in the set is taken to be an unambiguously 
defined physical or value outflow of a productive activity. 
The process of successive restriction is continued until a 
unique number, or some sufficiently narrow range of num-
bers, is defined. Each restriction in effect delineates a sub-
set of the original set. Each of the subsets is dependent 
upon a larger set. A dependent set is one that is completely 
contained in a larger set and is defined in some manner as 
a category or group of special cases in this larger set. Some 
of the pairs of subsets of the original set are independent in 
that neither member of the pair is defined explicitly or by 
implication as a subset of the other. Independent sets over-
lap if they are defined so as to make the argument more, not 
less, nearly determinate. Thus the process of successive 
restriction and exclusion proceeds by forming subcategories 
and only partially compatible restrictions until a sufficiently 
narrow subset is formed, where this subset's member(s) has 
the unique property that it satisfies the requirements of 
alternative chains of exclusion. Capacity is indeed merely 
a point satisfying successive restrictions. 
This means that we take an inventory of the various 
properties with which we wish to endow the capacity output 
and then form successively smaller restraining subsets as 
well as subsets that are only partially consistent with each 
other, until an output is determined. Let A represent all 
positive, rational, integral, and finite outputs and B1, B2 , B3, 
and B4 represent subsets defined by chains of successive 
restrictions. B2 is a subset of B17 and B4 is a subset of B3 • 
The intersection of B2 and B4 is a subset, C, of A and con-
tains only a single number. 
This is to say that 
C = B4 n Bl~, ( 1) 
where B4 C B8, (2) 
B2 c B1, (3) 
Bs c A, (4) 
and Bt CA. (5) 
Let y represent the single member of C, where this member 
is capacity by definition. Then 
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C= fy} = flB1, B2, Ba, B4=B1flB2flBanB4 (6) 
or more generally, 
'Y=nBi, i=l, 2, .. . ,n. (7) 
This illustrates the process of argumentation on capacity. 
A, B17 B2 is a chain of exclusion, where B2 is dependent 
upon B1 and is a subclass thereof. The formation of B2 
makes the argument more nearly determinate, because it 
narrows the range of outputs under consideration. B1 and 
B3 are independent, in that they are parts of different chains 
of exclusion. Taken together, they make the argument more 
nearly determinant, since they are only partially consistent. 
The formation of any subset that is identical with some 
other set adds nothing to the argument, because it does 
not go any further than any previous restriction. If any 
subset, D, is totally inconsistent with the other subsets, it 
represents an internal contradiction in the definition of 
capacity. It is possible for different measures of capacity, of 
course, to employ inconsistent sets in the definition of ca-
pacity. But this fact alone is sufficient to make two series 
of estimates behave differently. 
The exact sizes of the subsets are ambiguous when 
taken separately. They become definite when considered 
together as a pattern of constraints. For example, we assert 
that possible output is constrained by the shortrun pro-
duction function. That is, we exclude from the set of all 
outputs those outputs that are not consistent with this 
particular function. But this does not mean that we can 
take this constraint alone and actually enumerate the mem-
bership of the subset that conforms to it. The size of this 
subset is quite ambiguous until we know the other con-
straints, such as the amount of fixed equipment. But, each 
constraint that appears in the model necessarily excludes 
certain levels of production from consideration in managerial 
planning for output expansion. 
In short, a capacity argument consists of defining sub-
sets B17 ••• , Bn in economic terms. The model contains two 
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chains of exclusion, which may be thought of as the subsets 
B1. ... , B1 and Bh ... , Bn. Consider the economic meaning 
of the two chains of exclusion. 
One chain expresses all those constraints that arise be-
cause we fix a time period, x days, to which any firm in the 
economy is to be limited in its adjustment of output and 
a date of reference on which the supposed adjustment would 
begin. That is, the first subset contains all those levels of 
output that a given firm could conceivably reach by means 
of an x day adjustment beginning on some given day. The 
purposes for defining this subset are to indicate that the 
capacity number which is to be determined by the argument 
will have the property that it can be attained by the firm 
within x days and to fix certain conditions and relations 
both within the firm and in the economy at large. By 
fixing a time period for adjustment we are necessarily say-
ing that certain stocks of production resources in the firm 
(i.e., legally internal) and in the economy at large (i.e., 
legally external), on the basis of past experience, will have 
to be regarded as being fixed in supply during that time 
period. All of the subsets of this first subset, some of which 
overlap and are of different sizes, consist of plausible ranges 
of potential output levels. 
The second chain of exclusion is the specification of 
those psychological and political conditions in the economy 
which must be assumed to be in existence during and 
following the adjustment period. These are to be thought 
of as conditions that do not in themselves result from the 
fixing of a time period. They pertain to private market 
demand for final outputs, managerial aspirations, public 
demand for final outputs, and public policies relating to 
monetary regulation, price controls, subsidization, and wage 
controls. 
Thus there are two definitive restrictions in the de-
termination of capacity. They are definitive in that they 
fix the only constraints that must be postulated. All other 
constraints follow from them, either by implication or by 
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subclassification. Once the two definitive constraints are 
made definite, capacity is determined by implication. That 
is, as we proceed by successive restriction to exclude outputs 
from the original set and to seek out the physical or be-
havioral expressions of these restrictions, we find that there 
are two general constraints, "time" and "policy conditions," 
which either imply the specific constraints or contain them 
as subcategories. 
By "time" as a constraint we mean that one of the 
things that must be specified in a definition of capacity is 
the time period that is to be allowed to the firm for re-
organization. A meaningful capacity indicates an output 
that is an obtainable flow after a certain given reorganization 
period and in a certain policy climate, either actual or 
hypothetical. This is one of the two grand restrictions. 
The specific constraints implied by it are not in themselves 
sufficient to determine capacity, but they are necessary. 
(In order for capacity to be determinate, the other grand 
restriction, "policy conditions in the economy," and its 
corollaries, must be added.) A capacity estimate depends 
upon certain things being fixed and upon the rules govern-
ing the relationship of variable magnitudes to these fixed 
entities. Fixing the time period, which will be called the 
short run, necessarily implies that there are certain things 
which will have to be regarded as fixed stocks because they 
cannot be varied during that time period; their reorganiza-
tional requirements are too complex for such rapid variation. 
Each of these stocks is a constraint. Thus it is in the de-
termination of fixed stocks of inputs that the specification 
of a time period is crucial in the definition of capacity. 
For the economy as a whole the quantities of certain 
resources are fixed in the short run. But how can such a 
limitation in the economy constrain the capacity of a firm, 
if the firm regards the resource in question as a variable 
input? The demands upon this resource by various firms 
must be consistent. While the firm will indeed regard this 
resource as a variable input, it will nonetheless compete 
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with other firms for this resource, and with increasing in-
tensity as output expands. Competition for the pool of 
this scarce resource implies that this input will have a 
price, and thus a cost, to the firm. Even if the pool of a 
resource can be augmented during the period of adjust-
ment, this good will still have a cost when used by the 
firm. The firm merely experiences this particular stock 
constraint by way of an intermediate variable, the price of 
the input. The imposition of a time constraint fixes the 
quantities of certain resources in the economy at large; 
that is, it fixes a pattern of scarcities. An increasing need 
for such resources would likely lead to increases in their 
prices. Expected increases in factor prices are important 
factors in the determination of the capacity of a firm. 
The fixing of a time constraint will also freeze the 
technology in the economy and probably also the specific 
processes used by firms. In some cases it will limit changes 
in the schedule of production. 
It is true that the "external" stocks affect "policy con-
ditions in the economy." But we distinguish "external" 
stock constraints from "policy conditions," because we wish 
to separate the former from those economic conditions that 
arise solely from demand, expectations, business aspirations, 
and public policy goals, none of which arise directly from 
the specification of a time period. 
It is not always possible to maintain a perfect separa-
tion of the two categories, nor even always to keep specific 
constraints within each category separated. This is because 
of several complications in the process of successive restric-
tion. First, there is a cross-relationship between some pairs 
of subsets where each member of the pair lies in a different 
chain of exclusion. That is to say, there are cases where 
the nature of a restriction defined on one side of the argu-
ment affects the nature of a restriction defined on the other 
side of the argument. Thus, it is necessary to discuss such 
subsets together, in order to develop a realistic picture of 
managerial decision-making. (There are two instances of 
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this. The first has to do with input prices as constraints 
in production planning. Conditions affecting these prices 
can arise in either chain of exclusion. The stock of human 
and other resources affects input prices, but these prices 
are also influenced by public policy and law. These distinct 
kinds of constraints act together in the firm's decision-making 
and are more than likely indistinguishable to the firm. Thus 
they are considered together. This problem also arises in 
connection with those constraints created by the financial 
position of the firm. It is apparent that constraints which 
are analytically very different in that they come from dif-
ferent sources act together and are indistinguishable in a 
firm's decision-making.) Generally stated, the problem is 
that sometimes very diverse influences are merged into a 
single variable in a firm's decision-making. There is a 
second complication. Sometimes even subsets within the 
same chain of exclusion have to be considered simultaneous-
ly, because a firm's decisions on one variable cannot be 
made independently of its decisions on some other variable. 
Thus, as a case in point, it is not possible in the final 
analysis to deal with the employment of capital goods and 
labor separately. 
Let us outline the two chains of exclusion. The first 
is as follows. By fixing a time period for adjustment and a 
date of application for the period to begin, we also fix 
( l ) n stocks of productive goods within the firm, which 
the firm cannot vary during the given period because 
of technical complexities or contractual obligation, 
and n depreciation rates, salaries, rental rates, and so 
on, for these stocks, 
( 2) m prices which the firm must pay for productive 
inputs that it can employ on a variable basis during the 
period of adjustment, 
( 3) a reservoir of internal financial resources, which 
the firm will already have at its disposal during the ad-
justment period, and 
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( 4) certain shortrun limitations upon changes in 
method of production in particular and factor adapta-
tion in general. 
Restriction ( 4) is not necessarily distinct from ( l). Each of 
these restrictions in some way limits the range from which 
a firm may select a target output in planning for shortrun 
expansion. The second group of propositions consists of 
a set of hypotheses about human behavior. Each hypothesis 
concerns an assumption that should be made in computing 
a capacity output. A determinate argument about capacity 
must include assumptions concerning 
( 5) any increase in output price (or any other signal 
of increased demand), 
( 6) any possibilities for cost-plus contracting or sub-
sidization, 
(7) the minimum quality of output that would be 
tolerated by the users of the product, 
( 8) the money supply, the interest rate, the credit 
conditions generally, 
(9) cost controls by public authority, and 
( 10) the de facto managerial aspirations within the firm 
as to profit, total revenue, output, financial integrity, 
and so on. 
It remains to be shown that this set of restrictions is 
sufficient in number to determine a competent managerial 
decision on shortrun output expansion. How may we know 
that the list of constraints and interactions is complete? The 
test for completeness is found by turning to the formal 
definition of capacity. We formally define the capacity of 
a manufacturing firm as (a) an output that could be pro-
duced (b) in the short run under hypothetical conditions by 
(c) a designated collection of inputs each of which would 
have (d) a cost. The two chains of exclusion specify (a) 
the content of the output and its quality, (b) the goals that 
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would dictate shortrun managerial decisions on the level of 
operation and the external parameters that pertain to such 
decisions, (c) the fixed and variable inputs that are employed 
in the execution of such decisions, and (d) the cost of 
using such inputs. Thus the two series of restrictions are 
adequate. 
If the literature on United States productive capacity 
is studied in terms of the analysis in this chapter, a set of 
conclusions may be stated for each of the major con-
temporary capacity indexes for American manufacturing. 
These conclusions consist of an explicit statement of the 
operational definition of capacity which is employed; a state-
ment of the economic concept of capacity which is involved 
in the operational definition; and a subjective judgment 
about the usefulness (i.e., empirically demonstrated sig-
nificance) of the index in question, as to its explanatory 
and predictive power in the study of business behavior, and 
its conformity in its pattern of trend and fluctuation with 
other indexes of capacity and with indexes of capital-stock 
behavior, and are set forth in Table 1. 
The difference between the behavior of any two alternative 
capacity indexes must, for the economist to concern himself 
with it, be large enough to be of some consequence for 
decisions that are made in the application of public policy. 
Indeed, it seems that this relevance or lack of relevance of 
some difference provides the most useful criterion for de-
ciding whether to refer to said difference as "large" or 
"small"; if there is no administrative or social-philosophical 
significance of a difference in index behavior, the difference 
is "small." Continuing this line of reasoning, we say that 
a difference is "characteristic" if it not only is "large" but 
also is merely one member of a time series of such dif-
ferences. However, for purposes of clarity it needs to be 
pointed out that two indexes may exhibit a characteristic 
difference as far as the magnitude of capacity or its utiliza-
tion is concerned and yet still show the same pattern of 
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growth or fluctuation as far as direction of movement is 
concerned. And so, the definition of "small" differences 
needs to be made more rigorous; we say that a difference is 
"small" if two indexes support the same conclusion not 
only about the direction of a policy action (assuming a 
policy philosophy to be in existence, of course) but also 
about its magnitude. In short, the fact that two indexes 
tend to move in the same direction does not by necessity 
mean that there are no "large" (that is, scientifically inter-
esting) differences between them. 
The pertinent implication of these remarks is that there 
may be some numerical differences in the behavior of 
capacity indexes that should not, and in fact cannot, be 
taken seriously. Seen from this perspective, and in view of 
the difficulties in constructing and computing capacity 
indexes, there is a pleasing degree of agreement in the be-
havior of some of the existing published estimates, and 
the reference in the preface of this book to "the frequent 
failure of estimates prepared by different methods to be in 
agreement" loses some, although certainly not all, of its 
significance. One's willingness to be comfortable with 
"small" differences is strengthened by the fact that the 
present state of the literature on capacity is such that it is 
sometimes exceedingly difficult for a reader to know how 
to interpret the observed differences, in that the publica-
tions often do not give a complete list of assumptions that 
specify the determinants of capacity. The central purpose 
of this monograph is to show that a meaningful and con-
fident interpretation of the economic significance of a 
capacity estimate or index depends upon one's being 
conscious of these assumptions. Serious students of economic 
problems often waste their energy trying to interpret dif-
ferences between published estimates of capacity solely on 
the basis of incomplete published information about the 
preparation of these estimates. Perhaps a short exercise in 
index interpretation will be helpful. Consider the data in 
Table 2. 
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TABLE 2 
Alternative Capacity Indexes" 
1955-1957; 1953 = 100 
Hickman Federal McGraw-
Year (Variant Reserve NICB Fortune Hill 
Jb) Board 
1955 110 108 110 107 114 
1956 115 114 115 113 121 
1957 121 119 118 119 128 
a Compiled from Hickman, "On a New Method of Capacity 
Estimation," 547, and Almarin Phillips, "An Appraisal of Measures of 
Capacity," American Economic Review, LIII (May 1963), 281. 
b Based on direct use of aggregated investment data rather than 
aggregation of separately prepared industry indexes. 
The differences between the drifts in the Hickman, 
Federal Reserve, NICB, and Fortune indexes do not seem to 
be of much consequence so far as public policy is concerned. 
(The validity of this assertion, however, depends upon the 
assumption that the base-year capacity estimates upon which 
the indexes rest are not different in the "large" sense. My 
search of the literature has not yielded any information on 
this point.) This is not to say that the differences between 
these four series result solely from random errors. (More 
than likely, the differences, though "small," are systematic, 
in that they are probably the result of differences in cover-
age and of conscious or unconscious conceptual differences.) 
It is simply to say that it is impossible to tell from the pub-
lished literature alone whether and why this is or is not 
the case. 
Concerning comparisons between the behavior of any 
of these four indexes and the fifth-the McGraw-Hill index-
the differences seem clearly to be significant, that is, "large." 
The behavior shown for the McGraw-Hill index has dif-
ferent implications about how well the American economy 
was doing in forming capacity (and, conversely, about how 
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"badly" it was doing in creating what was shortly to become 
excess capacity during the 1957-1958 recession). But, here 
again it is impossible for the "outsider" to know what causal 
significance to attach to this difference in behavior, since 
the full set of implicit assumptions pertaining to the deter-
minants of capacity is not given in the relevant publications. 
In closing, consider two points. First, because of dif-
ferences in survey coverage, averaging, rounding, and bas-
ing, one cannot reasonably expect the magnitudes of capacity 
and its utilization as computed by the various methods to 
coincide in every instance, but it is reasonable to hope for 
the relative movements of the indexes to be the same. For 
example, while the McGraw-Hill and NICB indexes1 support 
the same conclusions about the extent of excess capacity 
in manufacturing at the 1957 and 1959 peaks and in the 
last quarter of 1961, the agreement for particular industries 
is not close. For 1959, only ten of the thirteen industries 
for which comparison is possible were shown to be in the 
same state of affairs as to the presence or absence of excess 
capacity. For 1961, only eight industries received the same 
classification on the existence of excess capacity. With 
regard to relative movements of utilization percentages for 
industry groups, the correspondence between the McGraw-
Hill and NICB series is even less. In half of fifty year-to-
year comparisons of the utilization percentages, the two 
measures move in different directions. Only rarely during 
this period is there an agreement on the amplitude of 
fluctuations. 
Second, the normal tendency of the increasingly 
sophisticated Federal Reserve utilization percentage to run 
at less than 90 percent (see Federal Reserve Bulletin, Nov. 
1966, pp. 1605-15), even during periods of prosperity, clearly 
and pointedly illustrates the point that the meaning of 100 
percent utilization is relative to the measure in question. 
Indeed, it would not be useful to prove deductively 
1 See Creamer, Recent Changes, 36-42, for the data discussed in 
this paragraph. 
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that the concept of capacity defines a measurable attribute, 
because after formulating a proof one would find that he was 
no better off than before. Capacity is a symbol for a hypo-
thetical output, and all that such a proof would show is 
that certain a priori definitions and empirical generalizations 
do indeed imply a relationship between certain hypothetical 
conditions and the level of production. More fundamentally, 
the general economic and political significance of a capacity 
index depends upon considerations outside the logic of the 
index itself, that is, upon the significance of the index's 
assumptions within the framework of some given economic, 
political, or sociological theory of human behavior. 
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